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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
Clt,:\IO CALI>WELL and ROBERT
1~~- (\)\ .. LX{;rrox, dba CALDWELL
.£\ND COVINGrr,ON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
~\_X SCHUTZ

DRILLING COMPANY,
INC., a corporation
Defendant and Respondent

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REI-IEARING

.._\ppeal fro1n the Judgn1ent of the Fourth Judicial District
Court for Uintah County, Hon. Joseph E. Nelson, Judge
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHE)ARING
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF
The petition of the respondent, Anschutz Drilling
0lnpany, Inc., respectfully shows to the Honorable
Supre1ne Court:
1

(

1. The above entitled court filed its opinion herein
in favor of appellant and against respondent on April 3,
1962.
2. By order of the court duly entered herein, upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

good cause shown and pursuant to Rule 76 (e) (4), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the time in which respondent
may petition for a rehearing has been extended to and
including the date of the filing thereof.
3. It is respectfully alleged that the court, by its
opinion and decision aforesaid, erred on the following
points, to-wit:
(A) The court erred in failing to rule favorably, or
to rule at all, upon respondent's contention that in this
action for specific performance the plaintiffs are required
to prove every element of their alleged contract by clear
and convincing evidence, and in failing to apply that
rule of law in weighing the evidence submitted by
plaintiff. (See pages 21 and 22 of respondent's original
brief.)
(B) The court erred in ruling and deciding, as
a matter of law, (as the court apparently does in the
third paragraph on page 2 of its opinion) that, if
respondent offered to contract with appellants and
waived time requirement for acceptance, appellants
"would then be entitled to a reasonable time to execute
the contract and 1nake the down payment" \Yithout
regard to the revocation of the offer before acceptance
\\·as co1npleted in the n1anner required.
(C) The court erred in ruling and finding that
appellants' agent Alloway offered to sign the contract
for his principal before the respondent's offer \Yas
\vithdnt\vn, (page 2, paragraphs one and four of the
opinion) for the reason that the same is entirely
unsupported by the evidence.
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(D) The court erred in ruling that respondent's
offer \\Tas, or could be accepted without tender of delivery
of the signed contract and tender of delivery of a
ePrtified check or its equivalent.
\\TI-IEI~EFORE

Respondent prays that this action
be reheard by this Honorable Court, and that said errors
be corrected, and that such other order be entered as
1nay be just.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Staternents as to the kind of case involved, the
disposition in the lower court, and the relief sought by
the respective parties on appeal, are all outlined in the
original briefs herein and in the court's opinion, so it is
deerned unnecessary to repeat them.
It is also believed that respondent's statement of
facts in its original brief was reasonably comprehensive
and the facts there stated will not have to be repeated.
However, in view of what respondent earnestly believes
\Yas a misapprehension of facts by the court, it is
believed that it will be helpful to the court, and to the
cause of justice, to amplify the statement of facts with
sorne additional specific references to the record of the
testimony.
By way of introduction may it be said, however,
that this is an action by which appellants seek specific
performance of an alleged contract for the sale of real
property (oil leases) based upon a pro posed written
3
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contract prepared and signed by respondent Anschutz
Drilling Company and submitted to appellants, but
never signed by appellants or delivered by them to
respondent as required by the terms thereof, and with
respect to which neither a certified check (as required
by the terms thereof) nor cash (if cash is to be deemed
the equivalent of a certified check) was ever delivered
or tendered to respondent as required by the terms
thereof.
Turning now to the factual matters involved
specifically in the petition for rehearing, the court, in
page 2, first paragraph, of its mimeographed opinion,
declares that "l\Ir. Alloway (appellants' agent for
closing the contract) offered to sign the contract as it
was." Again, in the fourth paragraph on the second page,
the court finds and declares that "he, (Alloway) did
offer to sign the contract and to pay the one-fourth of
the money on behalf of plaintiff." (Emphasis added.)
While we can understand how the state of the record
may have mislead the court in this regard, as it is quite
involved, it is respectfully submitted that there is
absolutely no evidence to support any such finding of
fact, or from \vhich any such finding of fact can be
inferred.
For the assistance of the court we shall try to
outline all of the testi1nony on this 1nost i1nportant
point. All of this evidence is found in the testilnony of
Alloway.
This \vas first mentioned at the trial in the testimony
shown at page 55, line 20, to page 56, line 10, as follo\rs:
4
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Q. (Continued by
offer to

~Ir.

~ir.

Bayle) Did you make any
Lynch to sign the contract as it was

prepared~

A. I was willing to sign it for Caldwell and
Covington, as agent, and for myself individually.
1IR. THATCHER: Object to it as not responsive and move it be stricken.
THE COURT: The· answer may go out.
Q. (Continued by Mr. Bayle) Did you sign it or
agree to sign it~
A. Yes, I agreed to sign it.
MR. THATCHER: Object to it as being a
conclusion of the witness and not relating to any
event.
MR. BAYLE: Well, we will cure that, YOUR
HONOR.
Q. (Continued by Mr. Bayle) What did you tell

1\Ir. Lynch in reference to signing the contract
if anything?
A. I told him my agency authority was limited
to the agency agreement which I had taken from
Caldwell and Covington. He expressed some
concern about the performance part of the
contract and that is when I agreed to be personally
bound on the contract. (Emphasis added.)
The next testimony which by any stretch of the
imagination could be said to relate to the problem occurs
on page 59, line 28, to page 60, line 8, in which ~Ir.
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Alloway explains his loss of temper when Mr. Wakefield
refused to accept Mr. Alloway's personal uncertified
check, as follows :
Q. Then what next occurred f

A. Well, about 5 :15 I really lost my temper,
which I have one, and I told Brother Wakefield,
"If you are not bound, I am not bound." And
Dennis Drake was present at the san1e time.

Q. Then what did he do1
A. Well, the thing that sort of spurred n1e on
a bit, I suppose in anger, was Mr. Drake came in
and said, "Well, that is tough". He said, "That
is tough, that it didn't go throngh.JJ It was tough,
because we were ready, willing and able to go
through with it. (Emphasis added.)
In this connection it should be observed that
Alloway's testimony is that he and his principals were
ready, willing and able to go through with the deal, not
that he ever really comuz unicated that willingness or
actually tendered tlze required acceptance and earnest
money. A secretly entertained "\Yillingness of course can
not affect the contracts of relationships of parties.
The next fragment of testimony on this point is
set out first on page 78, lines 20 to 26, of the transcript,
where Allo"\Yay, under cross exa1nination, "\Yas atte1npting
to explain a"\vay his sta ten1ent to respondent's representative at the close of negotiations (page 78, line 5) that
•'If you're not bound, I am not bound." as follo,vs:

Q. A1n I correct in assu1ning that

"~hat

you 1neant

6
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then was that if one party was not bound by the
contract, neither was the other party1
A. Well, that was the 1neaning of it and the
1ncaui11g being, if yo·u don't accept my check,
zrll at is the point in signing the contract?
The effect of this is that Alloway, when he found
that hi~ personal uncertified check would not be accepted,
and that the requiren1ent of a certified check (or perhaps
its equivalent) would not be waived, felt insulted, became
angry, and decided that if his personal check 'vas not
to be accepted as the equivalent of a certified check, and
and the contract proposed was not to be modified to that
extent, then there was no point in him signing the
contract, and hence he did not do so.
The final mention of the question of whether or not
there was ever any real tender of delivery of a signed
contract appears on pages 83 and 84 of the transcript,
\\'here the following exchange took place when counsel
for appellants was attempting to lead his witness into
testimony which would "plaster over" this hole in
appellants' case :
Q. Now, with reference to the contract, Exhibit

3,

~Ir.

Alloway, during your conversation with
~Ir. Lynch, did you at any time tell him that you
would sign that contract on behalf of Caldwell
and Covington~
THE COURT: Now, this
direct.

IS

not proper re-

~IR.

BAYLE : No, I am asking it on direct
examination.

'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MR. THATCHER: We submit it repetitious,
YOUR HONOR.
-(Tr. page 83, lines 21 to 30)
1IR. THATCHER: If there is any doubt, it
would probably be quicker to let him ans\Yer,
if he can.
THE COURT: You may answer.
A. Yes, I handed him my check, meaning I was
ready, willing and able to do it. The fact he
would not take my check, I neglected to do it.
-(Tr. page 84, lines 14 to 19)
It is submitted that this is all the evidence there
is on the question of whether there was an offer to sign
the contract unchanged or \vhether there \Vas any tender
of delivery thereof, as required by the tern1s of the
written offer before it could be deemed accepted.
Again, the court in its opinion states that the fact
that Allo\vay "did offer to pay one-fourth of the rnoney
on behalf of the plaintiff . . . . " (opinion page ~' 4th
paragraph). Again at the paragraph continued at the
head of page 3 of the opinion the court observes that
Allo,vay's conduct as testified to by hin1 and sun1rnarized
by the court supports plaintiffs' theory that plaintiffs
"rnade a valid and bonafide offer to perforrn" \vithin
the extended tin1e lirnit of the offer.
It is respectfully submitted that neither the evidence
or any reasonable inference thereon supports any finding
of faet that there "·as any tender or offer of a certified

8
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eheck, or of cash, if cash may be deemed the equivalant
of the certified check upon the state of the present record.
Here again \Ve shall attempt to present all of the
evidence submitted by plaintiff on this point.
There is no question but that Alloway did twice
tender hi~ personal uncertified check, once to lVIr. Lynch
( tr. 55) and once to l\Ir. Wakefield ( tr. 59).
Also as possibly having some remote bearing on
this question is the testimony already quoted from the
transcript, page 60, that appellants were "ready, able
and willing to go through with it (the contract)" but
again it must be borne in mind that this willingness not
only as regards the signing and delivery of the contract,
but also as regards the payment of tender of the earnest
n1oney which was required as a condition precedent,
\\Tas not in any way communicated. Again (tr. 56, lines
26 and 27) Alloway testified that "I asked him (Lynch) to
go down to the bank with me," and that Lynch replied
( tr. 57 line 5), "No, I won't go down there with you."
Alloway further testified (tr. 57 lines 6 to 13) with respect to Alloway's personal uncertified check as follows:

Q. Then what did you do, if anything, in
discussing the merits of the check that you had
tendered to him~
A. I asked him to deposit it. I asked him to call
the bank, if he didn't believe I had sufficient
1noney or go down with me, either one.

Q. \Vbat did he

do~

A. He wouldn't do anything.
Finally, on the second time through under examina9
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tion by counsel for appellants, the appellants' attorneyagent, Mr. Alloway did testify (tr. 59, lines 11 to 16
inclusive) as follows:
Q. Now, when you were talking with l\Ir. Lynch,
was there anything said about going to the bank
and getting cash~

A. I tried to get him to cash the check, yes.
Q. What did he say about

that~

A. He said, "I can't accept cash."
It must be noted again that this is in reference to
1\Ir. Allo\vay's attempt to persuade respondent's
representative JYir. Lynch to leave his office and go \vith
Alloway to another place for the purpose of assisting
Alloway in getting the cash in lieu of the certified
check which the contract specifically required.
There is no further evidence that \Ve are able to
find, and not one scintilla of evidence that there \vas
ever any tender of perforn1ance by plaintiff of the acts
necessary to constitute an acceptance of respondent's
offer.
STATEl\IENT OF POINTS
POINT 1. This court should have ruled that clear
and convincing evidence is necessary to 1nake out appellants' case for specific performance.
POINT 2. The respondent, having n1ade a si1nple
offer to enter into a contract \vith appellants \Yas not
required to leave that offer open for a reasonable time
or any tiu1e, but \vas by la\v entitled to \vithdra\v the

10
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same at any time before effective acceptance caused the
offer to ripen into a contract.
POINT 3. There is no evidence to support the
eourt's finding or ruling that appellants' agent offered
to sign and deliver the contract for his principal.
POINT 4. There is no evidence on which a finding
could be based that performance of the requirements of
the delivery of the signed contract and payment of the
earnest rnoney required by the offer was either made or
legally tendered .and refused.
POINT 5. As there was no performance or tender
of performance of the conditions requiring delivery of
the signed contract and payment of the specified earnest
n1oney, plaintiffs' proof of the alleged contract failed
as a matter of law.
ARGUl\fENT
POINrr., 1. This court should have ruled that clear
and convincing evidence is necessary to make out appellants' case for specific performance.
While it is conceded that on appeal this court
considers the evidence and every reasonable inference
that may be derived therefrom in the light most
favorable to plaintiff's theory of their case, when, as
here, a dismissal is granted at the close of plaintiff's
case at the trial, this rule, it is respectfully submitted,
has a most limited and special application to cases like
the one at the bar of this court, where proof of plaintiffs'
(appellants') cause of action must be made by "clear
and convincing evidence" as distinguished from '~a fair
preponderance" of the evidence.
11
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On pages 21 and 22 of respondent's original brief
herein it was, we believe, fairly and conclusively
demonstrated that in this action for specific performance
of an unsigned contract every element of plaintiffs'
case must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence,"
and the Utah cases defining that very heavy burden of
proof were cited.
Apparently the court completely overlooked this
most important point of law, for the court nowhere in
its opinion mentions or refers to the controlling principal
of law. It is respectfully submitted that this oversight
led the court into inadvertent error in its failure to
apply the rule to the evidence in this case. It is respectfully submitted that when no reasonable mind could say
that plaintiffs' evidence below amounted to "clear and
convincing" proof as defined in the law of Utah referred
to, then the trial court, and this court on appeal, must
rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs' case fails, even
though with a lesser burden of proof, it nright be proper
to submit the case to the trier of the facts.
The failure of plaintiffs' evidence to 1neet this
heavy burden, or even the ordinary burden, 'vill be 1nore
fully discussed hereafter. It is therefore respectfully
submitted that this court inadvertently erred in failing
to recognize and apply the rule of la'v that plaintiffs'
case must be proved here "'"ith ~'clear and convincing
evidence," and that upon rehearing the error should be
corrected.
POINT 2. 1 lze respondent, having nzade a sinzple
offer to enter into a contract with appcllan.t was not requ£red to leave that offer open for a reasonable t-ime or
1

12
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auy tin1e, but n·as by law entitled to withdraw the same at
auy tinle vefore effective acceptance caused the offer to
riJ)('JI into a contract.

In its opinion (page 2, third paragraph the court
says:)
"'1,here is no question but that ~fr. Lynch, who
was negotiating the contract for the defendants,
could 'vaive the strict time requiren1ent. If he
did so, the plaintiffs would then be entitled to
a reasonable time to execute the contract and
1nake the down payment." (Emphasis added.)
We confess that we are somewhat reluctant to
believe that court intended to say what this language
apparently does say, namely: that a simple offer to
contract to sell property without a specified time limit
for acceptance, and even without the existence of an
option contract bound by a consideration, 1nust be left
open for a reasonable time and cannot be withdrawn
by any action or con1munication until such time has
lapsed.
Indeed this language by the court seems to go even
further than the intention of appellants, who in their
brief (page 6) state their contention as follows:
'"It is plaintiffs' contention that defendant should
have given them a reasonable time in 'vhich to
obtain a certified check to be presented as earnest
1noney as they had accepted defendant's offer."
(Emphasis added.)
Whatever 1nay haYe been the court's intention in
this regard, in the context of the record in this case, in

13
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which the trial court concluded 'that there was no
evidence to support the allegation that the offer had
been accepted, and in view of the language of the court
in its opinion, in which the court speaks of the offeree's
indication of a "willingness" to accept the offer, and
the court's comments that a finding could be made that
the offerees were "prevented from accepting the offer,"
the quoted language of the court is certainly susceptible,
and almost seems to require the interpretation that a
simple offer cannot be withdrawn before a lapse of a
reasonable time, even though acceptance has not caused
it to ripen into a contract. It is submitted that this is
clearly not the la,v, and that if the contract had not been
formed before Saturday morning of February 25, the
respondent's withdrawal of its offer at that time
was valid and effective.
It is sub1nitted that the correct statement of the law
concerning revoking of an offer before legal acceptance
is discussed in respondent's original brief, pages 11 to
13 inclusive, and in the authorities there referred to. We
very respectfully observe that the court in its opinion
does not refer to this argument, or to the authorities
cited, from which, coupled \Yith the language used by
the court, it would see1n there is a strong inference that
the court overlooked this fa1niliar point of la\Y.
As further authority for the position taken by the
respondent that its offer 'vas revocable at any tune
before actual acceptance, \Ve respectfully refer the court
to,
Corbin On Contracts, Section 38,
the n1ore applicable portions of \Yhich are printed

14
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for the eourt's convenience in the Appendix hereof.
rrhe quoted language froln the court's opinion would
not be of ~uch great concern, perhaps, were it not for
thP fa<'t that the court in its decision had directed a full
trial of the issue, at which the opinion must be taken
b.'· the trial court as the law of the case. If the trial court
~hould aceept the apparent n1eaning of this language
and rule that this court's opinion is that respondent's
offer "\vas irrevocable until after the lapse of a reasonable
tiine, this could only lead to further expense and to
a second appeal.
If this ruling stands, and a simple offer is henceforth
to be irrevocable in Utah, the State's businesses are in
for a rough time in their future dealings after this
becomes knovvn.

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the quoted
ruling of the court is in error and should be corrected
on rehearing.

POINT 3. There is no evidence to support the court's
finding or ruling that the appellants' agent offered to
sign and deliver the contract for his principal.
As indicated in the statement of facts, the court.
8everal times indicated its belief that there was evidence
to support the finding that Allo,Yay had "offered" to
8ign and deliver the contract as required by the ternlR
of the offer. As indicated in the transcript of the
evidence, appellants' counsel several times tried to get
the appellant's agent-attorney, 1Ir. Alloway, to testify
to that fact, but each ti1ne ~Ir. Alloway, who as an
attorney apparently had a careful regard for he truth

15
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and his duties to the courts, very carefully avoided
making any such statement while he was testifying. Let
us analyze this testimony, upon which the appellants'
entire case rests.
On page 55 of the transcript appellants' counsel asks
Mr. Alloway the leading question "Did you make any
offer to Mr. Lynch to sign the contract as it was
prepared~" And Alloway carefully evaded the purport
of the leading question by saying "I was willing to sign
it .... " However even that ans"\Yer was striken by the
court as shown by the transcript.
It was then asked by Mr. Bayle "Did you sign it
or agree to sign it~ And he replied "Yes, I agreed to
sign it." However this was objected to, and was
objectionable as being a conclusion of the witness and
not relating to any event, and the validity of the objection was tacitly conceded by counsel for appellant's who
avoided a specific ruling on the objection by stating
Well, we will cure that, your Honor." Hence, there is
still no proper testimony in the record to support any
conclusion or inference that there was a tender or offer
to sign and deliver the contract.
4

'

In an effort to keep his pron1ise to cure the objectionable statement, attorney for appellant then asked the
question in proper form: "What did you tell ~Ir. Lynch
in reference to signing the contract if -anything·?" and
the witness Alloway replied, HI told hin1 n1y agency
authority "\vas li1nited to the agency agreen1ent 'vhich I
had taken from c~ald,vell and Covington. He expressed
son1e concern about the performance part of the contraet and that is "\vhen I agreed to be personally bound
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on the contract." Here again :fiir. Alloway carefully
avoided testifying that he offered to sign and deliver
the contract or said anything about the signing and the
delivery thereof. On the contrary he testified under
oa ih that he connnunicated his interpretation of his
agPncy authority as being limited so that (by necessary
inference) he could not sign and deliver the contract as
originally \Vritten, and further indicated in effect that
he \\~ould take over the deal "personally." This of course
he eould not do because the offer \vas not made to him
and his ~~agreement" or offer to handle the contract
versonally \vas certainly no tender of acceptance on behalf of appellant, but rather a counter offer which effectively rejected respondent's original offer, if one can
assu1ne that ~lr. Alloway was then acting as agent for
appellants.
The next scrap of evidence is found on page 60 of
the transcrivt \vhere !\Ir. Alloway testified that a Mr.
Drake can1e into the office and stated "Well, that is
tough." The \vitness continued: '"He said, 'That is
tough, because it didn't go through.' It was tough, because here \Ve were ready, willing and able to go through
\\Tith it." The last sentence about being ready, willing
and able \vas obviously the \vitness' volunteer comment
on the situation, a conunent 1nade in court and not forming any part of the transaction \vhich was the subject
of the trial.
Here again there is no evidence of any communication of readiness to perform the conditions required for
acceptance of respondent's offer.
The next fragment of evidence on this point is even
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less helpful to appellants. It occurs in the transcript at
page 78 in which the witness Alloway was explaining
his parting statement to respondent's representatives ,
that "well, if you're not bound, I am not bound." The
witness asserted that he meant that if one party was
not bound by the contract, neither was the other party,
and then made the additional volunteer statement "and
the meaning being, if you don't accept my check, what
is the point in signing the contract~"
Here obviously Alloway's conscience was impelling
him to tell the whole truth, even though he was anxious
to help his principals. The purport of this testimony, in
its context, is that he saw no point in signing or delivering the contract. It explained why he did not sign
it or offer to sign it. He had neglected to get a certified check, although he could have done so had he acted
promptly, and apparently it did not occur to him to
bring cash to respondent's office, and hence there was
no point, as he saw it at the time, in tendering performance of the requirement that the contract be signed and
actually delivered to respondent before it could become
binding. In other words, if the offer could not be modified to accept his personal uncertified check, he saw
no point in signing and delivering the contract, although
that also was required before there could be a meeting
of the minds of the parties. This \Yas his mistake, not
respondent's.
The final shred of evidence on this point is on
pages 83 and 84 of the transcript where Alloway was
asked \vhether, in his conversation \Yith Mr. Lynch, he at
any tin1e told 1\Ir. Lynch that he "would sign that contract
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on behalf of Cald,vell and Covington~" And over an
objection that it was repitious, later withdrawn, Alloway
testified carefully, '~Yes, I handed him my check, meaning
1 'H'as ready, 1cilling aud able to do it. The fact he would
not take 1ny check, I neglected to do it." (Emphasis added.)
Here again the court will note that Alloway was
trying hard to help his clients and still stay within the
bounds of the truth. His bald testimony, shorn of its
l~xplanations and excuses, was that he "neglected" to tell
~Ir. Lynch that he 'vould sign the contract. Of course
the contract \vhich is in evidence shows that it never was
signed, and now the positive evidence is that there never
\vas any offer of signing or any statement that he would
sign it. Far fron1 permitting any inference that an offer
\vas 1nade to supply this condition, the testimony of
Allo\\·ay positively negatives any offer to sign the
contract. Alloway's hopeful comment that he handed
to Lynch his (uncertified) check "meaning I was ready,
\villing and able to do it," of course can not overcome
the clear and unequivocal testimony which follows that
he never did tell Lynch he was willing to do it. Certainly
Lynch could not be held to have inferred, from the
handing him of an uncertified check, when a certified
check (or possibly cash) \vas required, was "sign
language" for "I a1n ready, willing and able to sign the
contract as written not,vithstanding 1ny limitations of
authority and notwithstanding the fact that I do not have
the earnest 1noney and can not procure it." An uncertified
check certainly "~as not any sign or indication of
'villingness to deliver a signed contract, as required.
It is respectfully submitted that from the above
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evidence no inference can be drawn that any performance
of the conditions or acceptance was made or tendered,
or that there was even a simple offer to perform which
was frustrated by respondent.
With respect to the court's cormnent in its opinion
that ''such business dealings must be carried on in good
faith," and that "the plaintiffs (appellants) made a
valid and bonafide offer to perform within a reasonable
time as extended by defendant (respondent) but were
prevented from doing so by the latters conduct," it is
respectfully sub1nitted that the court misapprehended
the purport of Alloway's testimony, which is all there
is on the subject, and "\Vas thereby led into inadvertent
error. There is not in all of the record one scintilla of
evidence that respondent acted in bad faith in any
respect, or that it or its agent did anything which would
obstruct or prevent Alloway from signing and tendering
delivery of the signed contract. On the contrary I\fr.
Lynch's warning that there was another deal pending
if this one "\vas not accepted is clear evidence, properly
regarded, that respondent's officers, in good faith, had
explained to 1\ir. Alloway 'vhy they were un'villing to
modify their original offer, or to provide title guarantee,
etc. or to accept Allo,vay's uncertified check 'vhich 'vas
tendered to them, or to accept Alloway as a party to
the contract on an offer made to the appellants.
Allo"\\,.ay never clailned or stated, although several tin1es
invited so to do, that he had made any offer of delivery
of a signed contract, or of a certified check, or of cash, or
that he "'"as prevented fron1 performing by any action of
t hP respondents. His "?hole testin1ony is that he had neglected to get the check certified "\vhile there 'vas yet time,
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although he knew of this requirement, and that because
his uncertified check was unacceptable he saw no point
in atte1npting performance on the other condition of
acceptance, and so neglected to perform or offer
performance.
It is submitted that appellants also must act in
good faith, that they can not claim that there was a
1neeting of the minds and a contract formed when the
conditions prescribed for acceptance of the offer were
not 1net by reason of the "neglect" of their agent, frankly
ad1nitted, and positively testified to.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the court
erred in holding that there is evidence which would
support a finding that Alloway offered to sign and
deliver the contract as written and was prevented from
so doing by the bad faith actions of respondent. In
this connection may we emphasize that Alloway's
testi1nony \Yas that his neglect to tender performance in
this regard was not caused by a statement that cash
\Yas not acceptable, but was caused by the refusal to
accept his uncertified check. Obviously no one can
contend that respondent was bound to accept Alloway's
uncertified check drawn on agency funds given him
for another purpose. Such action would have involved
respondent in liability for conversion of the funds.
~\llo\vay \vas not able to pay \vithout violating his trust
to another party whose money he had.
POINT 4. There is no evidence on which a finding
could be based tlzat performance of the requirements of
deli eery of the signed contract and payment of the earnest
nzouey required by the offer was either made or legally
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tendered and refused.

At the outset of this discussion we hope the
court will not take it amiss if we comment that we
believe it to be the law in America that free men can not
be bound except by general law or by their contract
completed on terms to which they assent at the time of
the "meeting of the minds" of the parties. No man is
required by law to enter into a contract, and it is a
corollary of this basic principal of liberty that one
making an offer may specify his own terms to suit his
own ideas, even if they be crazy, and unless these terms
are met, then there is no meeting of his mind, at least,
and no contract, even though a by-stander (such as the
court) can not see that the conditions he imposes are
reasonable. One is entitled in a free country to impose
unreasonable conditions if he wishes before he assents
to being bound on a contract. In this connection respondent imposed and communicated clearly a condition
that it would not be bound unless a certified check was
received by respondent. To make hun accept something
other than the thing he has specified, at the option of
so1neone else, is to deny him a liberty which the
constitution and the law, as \ve understand it, guarantees
to him, even though the court, and even though I might
feel that he is being unreasonable in asking for a
certified check instead of cash. Ho\vever that 1nay be the
court did consider this point and ruled against respondent
\vith respect to its privilege to insist upon a certified
check before it could be bound by its own offer conditioned upon delivery of a certified check, and not otherwise.
In principal, it is sub1nitted, there is little difference
bet,vcen forcing an offeror to accept Blackacre in lieu of
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his ~tipulated bargain for cash and forcing him to accept
c..·otnnlon stoek;-; of known and equivalent market value,
or the hand of the offeree's daughter in marriage. In
eaeh case he is forced to accept a substitute for his stated
bargain. l-Io\\·ever, as \Ve say, this was argued to and
consideretl by the court, and we do not intend to
belabor the point unduly. It would seem however that
in principle the ruling sets a very dangerous precedent.
\\;ith respect to the tender of the earnest money
( \\'hich \Vas admittedly not paid), here again the
appellant's case rests entirely upon the testimony of its
agent ...:\.llo\vay, and here again Mr. Alloway, although
carefully phrasing his answers in order to give as much
co1nfort as possible to his principals, carefully refrained
frou1 testifying that he ever tendered either a certified
eheck or cash, (assuming without conceding that cash
is the equi Yalent of a certified check in a contract
situation).
There is no question that he repeatedly tendered
his uncertified check, but there is equally no question,
and indeed appellants do not contend the contrary, that
respondent "\vas not bound to accept Alloway's uncertified
check as substantial con1pliance \vith its requirement for
actual delivery of a certified check. The only question relnaining is \vhether or not (assuming cash to be the equivalant of a certified check) .AJlo,vay tendered cash for the
earnest n1oney contract and \Vas refused. Mr. Alloway
testified ( tr. page 59, lines 11 to 16) : HI tried to get
hiln (Lynch) to cash the check, yes." And that Lynch
replied HI can't accept cash." Alloway then testified
that he asked Lynch to deposit his uncertified check or
to call the bank if he doubted there \Vas sufficient money
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on deposit to cover the same and that with respect to
this also Lynch "wouldn't do anything."
There is no other evidence with respect to the
tender of the certified check required as earnest money,
or the tender of any cash in lieu thereof.
It is respectfully submitted that properly read,
and even allowing every reasonable inference that may
be derived therefrom, there is no showing whatsoever
which would support a finding that the earnest money
was ever tendered or effectively offered and refused.
Even granting the assertion by the court that
respondent must carry on its dealing in good faith, the
utmost good faith does not require respondent to enter
into a contract on terms to which it is unwilling to assent,
and even more, it does not require respondent to perform
any work or labor, or to travel, whether 50 miles or 50
yards, or to do any other thing to aid and assist the
offeror appellants to raise and to tender properly and
legally the required earnest money. When an offer is
made upon prescribed terms and conditions it is
exclusively the problem of the offeree to make his
arrangements to comply with specified conditions for
the acceptance of the offer and the completion of the
contract. To hold that an offeree has the right to require
the offeror, or any other person, to go to work for him,
or to travel for him or to do any other thing for hun to
assist him in 1neeting the conditions and accepting the
offer would be to i1npose involuntary servitude and
slavery upon everyone 'vho atteu1pted to do business
through a contract. It is respectfully sub1nitted that
this is not the la,v, and that l\lr. Lynch "~as not required
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to go to the bank to get either a certified check or cash
but \\~as entitled to rely upon the effectiveness of the
prescribed conditions that the earnest money would be
.. received" by respondent at its office.
In thi~ ('Onnection it rnust be noted that lVlr. Alloway
never, in all his testilnony, claimed that he failed to
~ign and deliver the contract because of 1Ir. Lynch's
refusal to accornrnodate him by going to the bank, picking
up the cash, and returning it at his risk. He testified that
the reason he did not sign and deliver the contract
y,~a~ that respondent's officers would not accept his
uncertified check, and this made him angry and he
therefore neglected to sign and tender the contract, but
on the contrary declared "If you are not bound, I am not
bound." If one is to speak of good faith, one should
give so1ne consideration to a party who declares at the
conclusion of the negotiations that neither party is
bound, and then relies upon an alleged contract which
is not signed.
Let it be e1nphasized that Mr. Lynch never refused
a tender of cash. His only refusal was a refusal
of a request to go to the bank, which he was not
bound to do, and his statement in this regard that he
could not accept cash was not or is not a,dvanced as the
reason for failing to proc1tre and bring the cash to the
office and to tender it to hi11z. 1Ir. Allo,vay as an attorney
surely kno,vs, and kne'v at the time, that no one is bound
either to accept or reject cash, unless it is legally tendered
to him. '~rhe requirements for a tender of cash, or of any
other thing is considered on pages 16 and 17 of respondent'~ original brief, but was apparently overlooked
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by the court, as it is not referred to in the opinion. It
would seem to require a ruling contrary to that reached
in the opinion.
The court seems to feel that the conduct above
outlined, as reported through Alloway's testimony,
would support an inference and a finding that 1\Ir.
Lynch was "offered" the cash and refused it. It is
respectfully submitted that this is not so. Generally, as
shown in respondent's original brief a valid tender of
1noney requires that the money be present, ready,
produced, and offered to the person who is entitled to
receive it. Our legislature has seen fit to relax this
strict rule, but not to the extent that the court's opinion
would relax it. Sec. 78-27-1, U.C.A. 1953, is as follows:
"78-27 -1. An offer in writing to pay a particular

sum of money or to deliver a written instrument
or specific personal property, is, if not accepted,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of
the money, instrument or property."
The relaxation of the ancient requirements of legal
tender thus far, but no farther, shows a clear legislative
intention to hold to the ancient common law· rules
relating to tender of money required to be paid, or
tender of the 'vritten instrument, except as specified in
the statute. It n1ust be noted that the statute requires
that the offer be in 'vriting, and that it be not accepted,
or the offer is not the equivalent of a tender of
delivery or pay1nent. Here no one ever testified or
elain1ed that there "'"as ever any offer in "'Titing to pay
ea~h or to pay a eertified check, or to deliver the signed
contract. On the contrary the evidence is clearly to the
~

~
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contrary. No offer either orally or in writting was ever
!Hade. ~or ean it be said from the evidence in the record
that the eonduct of Ij~·neh prt~vented appellant's agent
from tendering eash. Allo\\·ay is a licensed and practicing
attorney, and n1ust be presu1ned to have known the
effect of a tender of pay1nent upon an unwilling recipient.
lie Yery earefully refrained from testifying that this
state1nent by ~lr. Lynch prevented him from tendering
ensh and his entire explanation is based upon his pique
and anger resulting fro1n the slight given his personal
uncertified check. If he had been misled thereby he, of
eourse, 'vould have said so. It is unbelievable that he
could have been misled, and it is submitted that
reasonable minds can not differ in this regard in view
of his skills and standing and his testimony. Certainly
there is no "clear and convincing" evidence from which
it could even be inferred that Lynch's statement prevented hiln from making a tender of cash and procuring
for his principals the benefit of a proper legal tender.
The most that can be said for his evidence is that he
tried to "force" Mr. Lynch into waiving the conditions
of his offer, and that 'vhen he found he could not, in
vie'v of his own doubt about his authority to execute
the contract without the changes, and when he found he
could not protect his principals and himself by entering
into the contract in his own name, he abandoned his
efforts, declaring that neither party was bound .
.L\s bet,veen two possible inferences, equally accep-

table, the trier of the facts can not be permitted to speculate, but as a matter of law he who has the burden of
proof must fail on such a record, and this is particularly
true w·here as here, the burden is to prove the case, and
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every element thereof, by "clear and convincing" evidence.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the court
erred in holding that the record discloses evidence which
would support a finding of either a tender or an offer
of delivery of the signed contract and payment of the
required earnest money. This error should in law and
justice be corrected.
POINT 5. As there was no performance or tender of
performance of the conditions requiring delivery of the
signed contract and payment of the specified earnest
money, plaintiffs' proof of the alleged contract fails as a
matter of law.
It would seem that little need be added on this
Point 5, although it appears to be necessary for logical
completness. A party can not be bound upon a contract
1nerely because he did not "cooperate" with and assist
the offeree in meeting prescribed conditions of acceptance, nor can he be bound upon a contract merely because
he may have had an ulterior motive (such as a better
deal in the background) for refusing to cooperate with
and assist the offeree in perfecting the offeree's acceptance. Having made the offer he is entitled to insist
upon strict performance with the conditions thereof, and
he is further entitled to \Yithdra": the same at any time
before the po\ver to create the contract by acceptance
has heen completely and effectively exercised. It is only
\Vhen this po\ver has been completely exercised that the
contract results and either party becon1es bound, and
clearly a secret "Tillingness to perform the conditions
required by the offer is not an acceptance. Equally
clearly, we sub1nit, neither is a 1nere 1nanifestation of
28
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·trill ingness to exercise the power by meeting and performing the prescribed conditions. In this case, it is submitted,
the record is clear that 1\Ir. Alloway never did exercise
the po\ver which had been conferred upon his principals
and that this po,ver was revoked not later than Saturd~1Y morning \vhen nir. Alloway was told that the land
had been com1nitted to another party in as much as he
had not concluded the contract the night before. In this
connection we again respectfully subn1it to the court
the citations in respondent's original brief with respect
to offeree's power of acceptance and acceptance, and to
Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 38, hereinbefore mentioned.
It is respectfully submitted that upon the state of
the record the law required the trial judge to grant
the motion of dismissal and that the judgment entered
thereon should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that this Honorable
Court inadvertently erred in the particulars hereinbefore
set out and that such errors should be corrected and that
upon rehearing the opinion of the court should be withdra\vn and rewritten in accordance with the contentions
contained herein and that the judgment of the trial court
belo\v should be affirmed.
Resp.ectfully submitted,
PAUL THATCHE'R of
Young, Thatcher and Glasmann
JOHN C. BEASLIN
and
RICHARD L. SCHREPFERMAN
of Holme, Roberts, More & Owen
Attorneys for Respondent
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APPENDIX
Quotation from CORBIN ON CON'"rRACTS, Sec. 38:
38.

Offers Are Usually Revocable

When one party makes an offer to contract w·ith
another he creates a power of acceptance in that other;
but also, except in the cases that are hereafter discussed,
he retains a power of revocation and withdrawal. The
method of exercising this power varies; usually it is by
giving notice to the offeree. By exercising this power
to revoke-by an effective revocation, the offeree's power
of acceptance is terminated. After an acceptane has
beome effective, there is no power in either party to revoke or withdraw.
Even though the offeror states \vhen he makes the
offer that the offeree shall have a definitely stated time
in which to accept, or states that the offer will remain
open for a definite time, the offer is nevertheless revocable at the will of the offeror.
An offer of this
kind seems to be \vhat son1e business men n1ean by a
"firm offer". There is an in1plied pron1ise not to revoke;
but if the parties think that it is effective to deprive the
offeror of the po\ver to revoke, they are mistaken.
Not infrequently, especially in the case of a \vritten
offer, it is expressly stated that it shall ~'not be subject
to counter1nand." by this, no doubt the offeror understands that he is pro1uising not to revoke the offer for
the preseribed period, or for a reasonable time; and
both parties 1nay believe that the offer is thereby n1ade
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irrevocable. Nevertheless, there still remains a power
The express or implied promise not to reto revoke.
voke is not enforceable, unless it is under seal, or a con~ideration is given in exchange, or the offeree has
ehanged his position in reliance upon it. The effect of
these factors in Inaking an offer irrevocable is discussed
hereafter .
.1\ statement by the offeror that his offer will remain

open for a specified time is not wholly inoperative, even
though it does not deprive him of the power to revoke.
Its effect is to determine exactly the duration of the
po"·er of acceptance, in the absence of some new terminating factor such as a notice of revocation or a rejection. It makes no difference whether the stated
ti1ne is unreasonably long or unreasonably short; it is
nevertheless controlling, so that an acceptance after the
expiration of the stated time is too late and an acceptance prior to such expiration is in time even though
the contract is no\v very disadvantageous to the offeror.
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